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Dalit Political Imagination and Replication in Contemporary Tamil Nadu 
D. Karthikeyan, Stalin Rajangam and Hugo Gorringe 
 
Tamil politics is dominated by the Dravidian parties and it is an indictment of their 
rule that untouchability and caste discrimination continue unabated in the state. Dalit 
movements arose in opposition, and as an alternative, to Dravidianism but have been 
shaped by their political context. A Dalit-Left alliance might offer one way out of the 
current impasse in Dalit politics. 
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Continuing Marginalisation 
The July 21 issue of EPW highlights some of the difficulties faced by, and the 
shortcomings of, Dalit politics in Tamil Nadu. The editorial rightly notes how 
practices of untouchability and casteist discrimination not only continue, but are often 
unchallenged in this the cradle of the Dravidian movement. It cannot be gainsaid that 
much Dalit politics revolves around issues of identity and occurs in the symbolic 
sphere. Likewise, the lack of Dalit leadership in the CPI(M) is a major omission that 
has prevented the communist party from emerging as a significant Dalit force. The 
editorial, however, does little to explain why Tamil Dalits face this predicament and, 
short of an implicit call for Dalit-Communist unity, it does little to suggest a 
resolution.  
 
Dalit politics in the state, furthermore, currently stands at a crossroads. As some sub-
Dalit groups are just starting to mobilise and organise themselves, existing Dalit 
parties are attempting to embrace the wider politics and identities of Tamil 
nationalism. Ambedkar, Marx and Lenin are neither unknown nor unread here though 
Phule is less prominent, and all four are less common than Periyar. Pandit Iyothee 
Thass and Rettaimalai Srinivasan in the past and a host of Dalit intellectuals from the 
1980s onwards, have articulated a coherent counter-hegemonic discourse but they 
have been joined or even replaced on contemporary Dalit banners by LTTE 
Prabhakaran on the one hand and a host of caste-specific characters from history or 
mytho-history on the other. Taking our cue from the timely editorial we wish to use 
this paper to outline some of the reasons behind the continuing marginality of Dalits 
in the state, reflect on current Dalit politics and conclude by considering some of the 
possible alternatives and avenues that are open to Dalit parties today
i
. 
 
Dalit Politics in Context 
If we are to understand Dalit politics in Tamil Nadu, then we should first stop 
expressing surprise and disappointment that untouchability persists in the land of 
Periyar. We need, at the outset, to appreciate that caste continues to be central to 
politics in the state not despite but because of the Dravidian parties. Numerous 
studies
ii
 have demonstrated that the non-Brahmin movement in South India was 
precisely that: non-Brahmin rather than anti-Brahmin. Having wrested political power 
from the stranglehold of the Brahmin minority, the Backward and intermediate castes 
monopolised power in their turn. They used their dominance to stall ambitious land 
reform programmes and Adi-Dravidar Welfare schemes, whilst retaining a veneer of 
social radicalism thanks to schemes such as the nutritious mid-day meal. 
 
The fractured nature of caste dominance in the state, where no one caste cluster is 
socially, numerically or politically pre-eminent, has veiled the extent to which social 
and political power are intertwined (Lakhsman 2007). Thevars, Gounders, Naickers, 
Nadars and Vanniyars all have pockets of dominance across the state and have been 
assiduously wooed by both the Dravidian parties. Caste majoritarianism is writ large 
in the prominence accorded to members of these castes in all government posts from 
police through panchayat leaders to ministerial berths. Post-Congress, Dalit MLAs 
have tended to attain distinction within Adi-Dravidar Welfare or minor departments. 
In a state governed by the non-Brahmin parties we can have a Brahmin chief minister 
but it is still almost unthinkable that a Dalit could attain that position.  
 
Thus it is that the biggest ‘freebies’ associated with Tamil elections tend to go un-
remarked upon. Whilst the press go to town on the schemes to hand out colour TVs, 
laptops, mixies and cheap or free rice, much less attention is paid to the subsidies such 
as cheap electricity handed out to farmers and landlords. When programmes like the 
NREGA have threatened to deprive these dominant landowning castes of their supply 
of cheap labour they have vented their anger through protests and the formation of 
caste based organisations (De Neve & Carswell 2011). Populist rhetoric and 
Dravidian oratory, as Bate (2010) shows, work by emphasising the honour and glory 
of pure Mother Tamil and glossing over uncomfortable ground realities. It is only the 
mobilisation of hitherto excluded castes that has revealed the caste character of state 
politics (Gorringe 2012).  
 
Dravidian politics, in other words, has masked the caste basis of social structures and 
appealed to Dalit voters using populist imagery, symbolism and rhetoric – especially 
as translated to the public through the medium of Tamil cinema. When the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam split in 1972 the presence of two rival Dravidian parties further 
reduced voter options by turning Tamil elections into bi-polar contests. Unlike in UP, 
for instance, votes here tend to be split two ways meaning that a fairly high share of 
the vote is required to win in each constituency. This makes it exceedingly difficult 
for third parties to have an electoral impact. The first-past-the post electoral system 
similarly favours established parties (CERI 2009; Wyatt 2009). The upshot is that 
even national parties with effective party organisation and financial clout like the 
Communists fall into line with one or other of the DMK or ADMK come election 
time, leaving newer or smaller parties with few if any viable allies. In terms of Dalit 
politics more specifically, the above issues combine to mean that even in reserved 
constituencies non-Dalits tend to decide which Dalit will contest let alone win 
(Gorringe 2005).  
 
As Dravidian hegemony has been challenged by the rise of smaller parties over the 
past two decades, elections have come to be associated with vote-buying, massive 
expenditure and corruption on a grand scale (EPW 2010). Even local council and 
Panchayat Presidential candidates currently spend several lakh rupees to secure 
election in expectation of the commissions that they will receive once in post. It is 
within this context that we need to engage with and voice our criticisms of 
contemporary Dalit and left politics. It is an oft repeated truism that had Communist 
or Dravidian parties implemented their promises, they would have rendered the 
emergence of the Dalit parties redundant. It is a measure of their failings in this regard 
that such mobilisation both was and is still necessary. Indeed, Dalit movements 
emerged with an informed, well articulated and clear sighted critique of existing 
politics (Karthikeyan 2009; Roberts 2010; Rajangam 2011). It is not in ideology or 
analysis that they are lacking so much as in implementation. Whilst we have no desire 
to exonerate Dalit politicians for moving away from these founding principles, it is 
important to bear this socio-political context in mind when assessing their 
performance. Few institutions or organisations in the state – political or otherwise – 
are immune from the culture of immediate rewards and fewer still articulate a politics 
that breaks with Dravidian populism. Appraisals of Tamil Dalit politics should be 
rooted in an understanding of this backdrop. 
  
Populism, Identity and Symbolism 
Subramanian (1999) notes how Dravidian politics rests upon populist appeals to the 
‘people’. He differentiates between ‘paternalist’ and ‘assertive’ forms of populism. 
The former revolves around a benevolent leader or patron who acts as a benefactor 
and protector of the needy. MGR – the three-time Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu - is 
held up as the archetype of such politics and was routinely portrayed as the champion 
of the poor and vulnerable. Assertive populism, by contrast, makes demands on behalf 
of excluded groups who wish to be admitted into the mainstream. As it is less top-
down and entails making demands of elite groups, Harriss (2000) argues, it tends to 
be the preserve of upwardly mobile social groups. Populism, however, as Swamy 
(1998) notes, is often observed more in the sphere of rhetoric than programmes. It is 
this rhetoric, Bate (2010) argues, that has dominated Tamil politics for the past four 
decades. 
 
Political challengers, thus, face an uphill struggle to get their voices heard let alone 
persuade voters to switch allegiance. Lacking resources and access to state benefits 
successive political challengers the state have had recourse to assertive forms of 
populism urging particular sub-sections of the population to assert themselves against 
discrimination and marginalisation. These appeals, perforce, hinge on identity. The 
Paatali Makkal Katchi (Toiling People’s Party), thus, emerged from the mobilisation 
of Vanniyars and demanded Most Backward Caste status for the group as well as 
benefits in proportion to their numerical strength. Puthiya Tamilagam (New Tamil 
Society) followed with calls for Pallars (a Scheduled Caste) to be recognised as 
Devendra Kula Vellalars and provided with various benefits. Shortly thereafter the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK - Liberation Panther Party) mobilised mainly 
Paraiyars as first Dalits, then cheri-people and now downtrodden Tamils. In most 
cases caste-based mobilisations have aspired to positions from which they could 
dispense paternalist largesse. Lacking the means to become patrons, they have time 
and again been forced back onto their identity to mobilise support.  
 
Dalit politics, however, has always combined identity-based demands with calls for a 
more equitable distribution of resources. Whilst the mainstream discourse casts the 
Dalit parties merely as an extension of Dravidian politics, in actual fact they arose in 
opposition to the dilution of Periyarist ideals by the very parties that claim to carry 
forward his legacy. The key motto of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, for instance, is the 
Ambedkarite assertion that: ‘caste annihilation is people’s liberation’. They emerged 
seeking an alternative politics rather than a continuation of the status quo. Backed into 
a corner on the question of caste existing parties have been forced to give ground or 
address hitherto neglected issues. Whilst the CPI(M) has worked with Dalits since the 
outset on a class basis, their Tamil Nadu Untouchability Eradication Front (TNUEF) 
is a direct product of the Dalit upsurge. It is only following autonomous Dalit 
mobilisation that the Communists came to the realisation that caste had to be tackled 
head on. Even so, the TNUEF demonstrates the limitations of their approach to caste-
based inequalities in that the focus is on tangible instances of untouchability rather 
than on the underlying structures of caste. They can, thus, mobilise to bring down a 
caste wall, but are much less effective at bringing down the walls that exist within 
people’s minds. In other words, their actions are every bit as symbolic as those of the 
Dalit parties but are placed within a different frame of reference. 
 
Activists point to the lack of Dalits in the upper echelons of the Communist Party as 
evidence of how far such organisations still have to travel to truly represent their 
concerns and voices. At least, though, their response has been a positive attempt to 
address caste discrimination. A more paradoxical outcome of Dalit mobilisation has 
been the way in which the dominant castes have recently embraced victimisation and 
portrayed themselves as at the receiving end of reverse casteism (De Neve & Carswell 
2011). Hence there are calls for the repeal of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act 
1989 and demands for party members to avoid cross-caste marriages. Recently such 
castes have also mobilised around this newfound victim mentality mustering around 
banners like the Thevar Protection Front, or The Non-Dalit Common People’s 
Association. The lack of substance behind such demands, however, is seen in the 
respective significance accorded to the memorial days of Muthuramalinga Thevar and 
Immanuel Sekaran
iii
. Where the city of Madurai is shut down for the celebration of 
the former, Dalits still struggle to have Immanuel Sekaran recognised as a major 
figure as was brutally demonstrated in the police firing on participants gathered in 
Paramakudi in 2011. Even though Dalit parties lack political power or influence to 
any great degree and even though ordinary Dalits still struggle to get cases filed or 
registered, the mere fact of their political participation has sufficed to create such 
counter-mobilisation. 
 
That Dalits are ‘subjected to severe social repression’ today, thus, is not surprising, 
but there are two points to make here. Firstly, the stark violence that culminated in 
major riots and murders such as the murder of seven Dalits in broad daylight in 
Melavalavu in 1997 has declined as Dalits have fought back in kind or in court. 
Secondly, that acts of untouchability continue to be raised is also, in some ways, a 
sign of change. Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998) point towards the emergence of 
‘new’ forms of caste violence that arise in response to the subaltern challenge. On the 
one hand Dalit activism brings issues to light in a way that has not happened before 
and brings everyday repression into the open. Their role in spreading a legal 
awareness and rights consciousness amongst the oppressed cannot be over-stated. On 
the other hand, the sort of counter-mobilisation described above pits socially-
dominant intermediate castes against those who dare to question their dominance.  
 
As Pandian (2000) and Rajangam (2011, 2012b) highlight, most anti-Dalit violence in 
the state is perpetrated by the intermediate castes and occurs to demonstrate that they 
are of higher status than their victims. In Parali Puthur (in Southern Tamil Nadu) for 
instance, intermediate caste Mutharaiyars ransacked and set light to Dalit homes, beat 
villagers and threatened children due to the fact that VCK cadre dared to hoist their 
flag near the main road. In neighbouring Pudukottai District, however, tea-shops serve 
both Mutharaiyars and Dalits with separate glasses because they are seen as lower 
than, and as a threat towards, Kallar supremacy. Marx is certainly not irrelevant in 
this context but it is, we would suggest, the intermediate castes who have greater need 
to absorb his lessons.  
 
Caste-ing Votes: Dalit Electoral Politics 
It is important to note that Tamil Dalit politics cannot be viewed in isolation. 
Although it is a huge disappointment that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal and Puthiya 
Tamilagam have not been able to create more change or apply pressure on their 
coalition allies to do so, we need to recognise that they operate in a political 
environment that severely limits their options. Dalit parties cannot win on their own in 
this state in part due to the bipolar nature of politics. Where votes are split two or, at 
most, three-ways Dalit parties simply do not have the numbers to succeed. They need, 
therefore, to find likely allies. Unlike Vijayakant – the latest film star to enter politics 
- they also lack the financial clout to compete. They are therefore reduced to seeking 
coalition partners who will not only grant them a reasonable number of constituencies 
from which to contest but will help bankroll their campaigns as well. Given the 
monetarisation of Tamil politics over the past decade (EPW 2010) their lack of self-
reliance serves to curb their radicalism.  
 
Dalit political parties, thus, are caught in a double bind. Either they follow the 
template set by others and are condemned to remain bit-part players in a system that 
favours the resource-rich. They are, then, impotent paternalists reduced to feeding 
from the scraps distributed by the two main parties - VCK MLA Ravikumar, in this 
vein, hailed the DMK scheme to replace mud huts with concrete houses as a triumph 
of political participation (Jayakumar 2010). Failing this, they can focus upon 
assertive, identity-based rhetoric that is either symbolic such as the furore over the 
Ambedkar cartoon, or is rarely realised in practice. Whether standing alone or in 
alliance, furthermore, Dalit parties require the votes of other communities to stand any 
chance of winning (Karthikeyan 2011; Roberts 2010). They have, to this end, 
increasingly adopted an assertive Tamil identity and offered posts in the party to non-
Dalits in a bid to broaden their vote-base.  
 
This has created a gap between the parties and their core Dalit constituents, but has 
failed to expand their vote-base significantly. In the current political dispensation this 
means that Dalit parties can either stand alone and win nothing but respect from 
supporters, or they can ally with various other parties and compromise on their core 
principles in search of political power. That allying with Dravidian parties should 
entail a dilution of anti-caste radicalism is, of course, a major indictment of those 
parties but it is a pressing problem for Dalit politics. This is not, of course, a purely 
Tamil issue as seen in CERI’s (Campaign for Electoral Reforms in India) call for  
proportionate representation to: ‘ensure the participation of all communities in 
governance, and check all tendencies to usurp … power by some caste groups in India 
(CERI 2009: 15).  
 
New Directions? 
Over the course of the past few years these contradictions have increasingly been 
acknowledged by the various Dalit leaders who have sought to rethink and 
reconfigure where they stand. Dalit politics in the state has tended to be ideologically 
inspired, but event sensitive. For all the theoretical and rhetorical commitment to land 
reforms, caste eradication, class equality and women’s rights, for instance, the 
emphasis of each party tends to be on day-to-day issues of discrimination with a few 
big conferences on the core themes to emphasise commitment. From this perspective 
the Dalit movements continue to be shaped by the imperatives of the present; 
responding to one crisis after another rather than building up an alternative 
(Karthikeyan 2009). Now that they have contested elections and gained a number of 
political victories, however, voters expect more than empty or aggressive rhetoric. 
One unintended consequence of Dalit assertion was to compel Communist parties to 
take Dalits issues more seriously now, ironically, it is the grassroots campaigns of 
TNUEF amongst Dalits across the state that has forced the Dalit Parties to reconnect 
with their own constituents. 
 
The VCK, thus, has embarked on a process of wholesale restructuring in a bid to 
reach out to the mainstream. The demand for gold to celebrate Thirumavalavan’s 50th 
birthday arises at this juncture. The comparison with Mayawati here is unfair. Whilst 
there is an element of self-aggrandisement, a better point of reference might be the 
Bahujan Samaj Party’s motto ‘one member, one rupee’, in that the object of the gold 
is to bolster party finances so as to launch a TV channel that will provide them with a 
media presence. In a state where the reach of television is remarkably high due to free 
distribution and where each political party has their own channel such a focus is 
understandable. Whether it should be their primary focus or not is another question, 
but setting that aside, the call for gold has been too easy a target for many 
commentators. It certainly carries the whiff of dowry especially when party leaders 
urge members to treat this as the unmarried Thirumavalavan’s wedding. Take away 
the ever present contradictions around women’s rights and the talk of treasure, 
though, and what you have is a party transparently seeking to raise resources from its 
members. How many other parties could offer as clear a trail to the assets that 
finance(d) their media enterprises? The call for gold not only carries a novelty factor 
that encourages donations, according to several respondents it is more easily 
accounted for than cash donations. The issue for us is less the emphasis on gold than 
whether the money thus raised will be used to good effect. The fear is that the 
acquisition of a media channel will simply fuel the short-term emphasis of Dalit 
politics in the state when it is crying out for a longer-term vision. 
 
In short, it would be fair to say that the Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu educated its 
constituents to some degree and agitated society for a time but has failed to properly 
organise itself. Dalit parties still lack infrastructure, established secondary leaders, 
local offices and sustained, ideologically driven campaigns. As such they have failed 
to move onto next level as they promised to do when they entered elections as a Third 
Front in 1999. Unless this period of introspection results in a change of direction then 
Dalit Politics will continue to be characterised by an emphasis on symbolism and 
identity. Worse still, even as caste walls between Dalits and caste Hindus have been 
dismantled new walls have taken root between different Dalit castes. The absorption 
of brahminical values of hierarchy and untouchability by Dalits represents perhaps the 
single biggest failure of, and challenge to, Tamil Dalit movements.  
 
Adversity can occasionally lead to opportunities, however, and recent intra-Dalit caste 
violence in W. Pudhupatti compelled Dalit leaders to come together with the CPI(M) 
in July 2012 in search of possible solutions. This meeting was hosted by Yakkan, a 
Dalit intellectual, who is one step removed from the compulsions of politics. His 
intervention reminds us that Dalit liberation cannot and should not be left in the hands 
of Dalit Parties alone. Dalit unions, intellectuals, administrators and organisations 
have a key role to play too. Dalit movements need to accept practical guidance and 
advice from outside since electoral politics, which was initially seen as a tactic, has 
become an end in itself (Karthikeyan 2011). More energy and money is expended on 
seeking election than realising the movement’s objectives. There is a need for clarity 
of purpose and a longer term vision that extends beyond the coalition partners of 
tomorrow to consider Dalit livelihoods. Rather than running after and trying to please 
and appease potential allies by cheering them on, offering them support or awarding 
them prizes, Dalit and Communist parties could then formulate a coherent and radical 
programme of action that combines the demands of recognition with those of 
redistribution. Clearly there are commonalities of interest between the Communist 
and Dalit parties but the onus must be on the former with their national level standing 
and resources to take the lead. It is perhaps from meetings such as that at W. 
Pudhupatti that an alternative politics which challenges the hegemony of the 
Dravidian parties and truly addresses the needs of the impoverished and subordinated 
masses can emerge. 
 
                                                 
i The empirical detail in this paper is drawn from recent research carried out by the three 
authors. Gorringe has conducted research on Tamil Dalit Politics (ESRC Grant RES-062-23-
3348), as a reporter for The Hindu Karthikeyan frequently covers issues related to Dalit 
politics, and Rajangam has conducted extensive research on Dalits and Dalit politics across 
the state most recently for his 2012 book on the Villupuram riots in 1978 (Rajangam 2012a).  
ii For detailed accounts of the interplay between caste and Dravidianism see: Karthikeyan 
2009, 2011, 2012; Lakhsman 2007; Rajangam 2012b; Subramanian 1999; Wyatt 2010.  
iii Pasumpon Muthuramalinga Thevar was a Forward Bloc leader who mobilised members of 
the intermediate Kallar, Maravar and Agamudayar castes who comprise the Thevar caste 
category. Immanuel Sekaran was a Pallar Dalit leader who fought against caste discrimination 
and dominance and was murdered during caste clashes in 1957. 
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